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There is a very helpful discussion as to who can qualify as dependents of the taxpayer. An interesting case is given where a father
supports his daughter all the year long, and gives her away in marriage in December. He is prevented from claiming a deduction for
her support by the fact that she signed and filed a joint tax return
with her husband. The father was, however, entitled to deduct the
medical expenses he had paid since under Section 213 (a) "medical
expenses paid for a dependent are deductible even though an exemption may not be claimed for the dependent."
The editor of Working with the Revenue Code has devoted
many pages to corporate distributions. It is here that an accountant
finds his work laid out for him. Varied and complicated as well are
the problems that arise under this chapter. Many of the problems are
such that much tax money may be saved a client if the right course is
taken. Nearly ten pages of the text are devoted to loss carry-overs, and
nearly as many to deferred compensation.
In making a settlement with the tax authorities over a doubtful
claim, our editor reaches the conclusion that "In any event, a more
favorable settlement climate appears to be in the Tax Court and not
in the pre-docketed stage before the Appellate Division."
The tax lawyer who is constantly working with the 1954 Code is
certain to gain much from this summary of the conclusions and opinions of the men who do the figuring on tax returns.
W. Lewis Roberts
University of Kentucky
College of Law
ThE PowER EL=rE. By C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford 1956.*
This is an exhilirating book that deals with fundamental problems.
Its orotund style carries the reader from one crescendo to the next.
Though its themes are familiar, one is challenged to fresh thinking.
The two chapters on the "social elite", for example, will become
standard college assignments.
This is also an exasperating book. Whether or not its conclusions
are valid, they cannot be derived from the data offered. The few bits
of new data are handled incautiously. Language is used as a banner,
* The scope of this review encompasses much more than a mere summarization of the contents of Mills' book. The authors challenge many of the statements
and conclusions of Mills and build, around the discussion of the book a general
analysis of the problem of power. Citations to pages of the book have been made
in the text to minimize footnotes.-Ed.
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not a tool. One is stimulated but he will find little guidance to sound
judgment or wise policy.
Since the role of power in society is so problematic, the several
themes propounded by Mills call for scrutiny, especially since Mills'
position and reputation will lead many to accept his conclusions. It is
our intention to examine this book from two points of view: 1) textual
criticism and stylistic examination raise questions as to the author's
methodological habits; and 2) what is known about our society does
not accord with Mills' conclusions.
A few comments about the manner in which the author handles
logic and facts are followed by a summary of Mills' broader philosophy
of society as expounded in an earlier book. Later sections of this
article deal with the recruitment of the power elite, their operations
upon government, the paradoxical reluctance of this alleged elite to
rule, and the fundamental question of elite functions.
Every Man His Own Methodologist
Mills spurns collaboration with the established social disciplines
and dislikes the conventional tests of evidence. Academic men "remain on the most concrete levels of description" and view reality "in
terms of existing detail"(245). His eschatological mood enlarges
upon provocative hunches and though he decries the rise of public
relations he cannot resist argument by loaded phrase: "visible government"(280), "higher immorality"(341). It is difficult to entice Mills
into a discussion, so to speak, for he finds others' perspectives ridiculous.
He perceives "an elite in irresponsible command of unprecedented
means of power and manipulation" where other scholars naively discover "a scatter of reasonable men overwhelmed by events and doing
their best in a difficult situation"(825). Again, Mills excludes a whole
series of perspectives as when he says liberals have not defended any
"militantly liberal position" but have been content mainly "to celebrate
the 'civil liberties,' in contrast with their absence from Soviet Russia"
(834).
There is a consistent failure to use the comparative method by
searching for parallel processes in familiar settings. For example, he
does not seek to draw causal explanations from "the accumulation of
advantages" in professorships at great universities. Over and over
the assertion is made that elite power is growing though most of the
evidence relates to recent years only and even that evidence is used
selectively while contradictory indications remain unexamined.
The task of drawing general conclusions about power from this
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study is magnified by Mills' penchant for circular reasoning, as in this
statement: "American 'militarism,' accordingly, involves the attempt
of military men to increase their powers"(223). One infers that Mills
was impelled to write his book because he sees a power elite threatening our way of life; but in asserting the key role of these elites he
never searches for their positive functions. A concession often is
worded so as to imply support for his thesis: "Their inclination for
longer-run profits, for a stable take, requires that corporations become
more political"(126). The expansion of high schools "has met the business demands for white-collar skills at the public's expense7(317).
The task of fitting Mills' viewpoints into our developing knowledge
about society is magnified by the fact that he never identifies the role
of the elite in terms of actual decisions but is content merely to assert
its power. Only the more careful readers, apparently, have discovered
this hiatus in numerous recent discussions of power.
The same problems that Mills deals with on the national scale
have been taken up at the level of local communities in recent years. 1
It is essential to notice that none of these studies has found consensus
among local residents about the membership of local elites. Nor has
any investigator yet demonstrated the power of a local elite on concrete issues. How much more difficult, then, to identify a national
2
power elite.
Mills' Positive Philosophy of Society
This book lies in the tradition of populism, the Bull Moose, and
the New Freedom, combined with that precious condiment- generic
American cussedness. Mills' philosophy is to be found in an earlier
book,8 and this philosophy turns out to be guild socialism. A little attention to how Mills deals with these broader issues helps one to
evaluate his manner of analyzing the problem of power.
IR. E. Agger, "Power Attributions in the Local Commuity. 3 4 Social Forces
322-31, 1956: A. A. Fanelli, "A Typology of Community Leadership .0..", Id. at
332-8, 1956; A. A. Fanelli, "Extensiveness of Communication Contacts and Perceptions of the Community", 21 American Sociological Review 439-46, 1956; M.
Bressler and C. F. Westoff, "Leadership and Social Change. ... , 32 Social Forces
235-43, 1954; F. Hunter, Community Power Structure, 1953, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina. See the review of Hunter by H. Kaufman and V. Jones,
"The Mystery of Power," 14 Public Administration Review 205-12, 1954; see also
H. A. Simon, "Observation and Measurement of Political Power," 15 journal of
Polities 500-16, 1953; R. Bierstedt, "An Analysis of Social Power," 15 American
Sociological Review 730-8, 1950; R.0. Dal in Research Frontiers in Politics and
Government, 1955, Washington: Brookings Institution, 550-7.
2P. H. Rossi has given a broad evaluation of these studies in "Community
Decision Making", 1 Administrative Science Quarterly 415-43, 1957.
8 The New Men of Power: America's Labor Leaders, 1948, New York: Harcourt. "Inside this country today, the labor leaders are the strategic actors" (8).
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He wants direct democracy. Since the workshop is a more appropriate political unit than the precinct, "the unions would have to strive
to take from the employer the right to appoint supervisors and foremen."4 Everyone vitally affected by any social decision is to have a
voice in the decision and a hand in its administration. 5 One wonders
what chance Negroes would have to enter new employment in such a
situation.
Mills anticipates that the present industrialists cannot raise levels
of living; hence unions must take the initiative in planning. If their
plans are rejected the industry should be nationalized and "the workers
allowed to run it according to the plans they have set forth." There
should also be consumers' price control committees and refusal to pay
higher prices and rents. White-collar workers are likely to be more
receptive to price than to wage appeals.
The implications of this proposed organization of society for the
problem of power can be summarized in a few questions. 1) How
achieve consensus between workers and consumers about prices?
2) How achieve shifts of resources from declining to rising industries
or firms? 3) How insure the labor discipline necessary for rising productivity? 4) With so narrow a focus upon economic affairs, how can
the overt level of conflict within society be less than today? 5) Who
will control the new managerial elite?
There is reason to doubt whether Mills has asked the important
questions about the role of power in society. The elites deserve attention, but Mills implies we already understand their role. At no time
does he examine the precise operations of any single elite in any actual
situation. He offers hypotheses as proved conclusions and by his
powerful writing shortcuts the tortuous path to knowledge.
Suppose we actually had a relatively complete picture of the composition of the elite in the early days of our nation. What might one
have predicted about the later history of the nation? We can actually
test this question by using the sociogram of the national elite in the
first generation of nationhood that was constructed by Robert K.
Lamb.7 The writers' judgment is that from this map of elite relationships one could have made only the sketchiest of predications. Indeed
this earlier elite was unable even to preserve its own prerogatives.
4 Id. at 254.

5 Id. at 258.
6 Id. at 257.
7 Cited in K. W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, 1953, New
York: Wiley, 18-20.
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Recruitment of the Elites

One can agree with Mills that the social origin of elite members is
less decisive for their operations than either their personality traits or
their indoctrination after attainment of power. Yet Mills takes much
time to document the upper class origin of each elite. Co-optation of
new members and the growth of common codes of conduct reflect the
fact that elites are a fraternity of the successful, he says. He fails,
however, to examine the possible bearing of this common trait, success, upon elite behavior.
The foundation of these codes guiding recruitment and training is
left unexamined. Surely there are some functionally appropriate elements in such norms over and beyond their defensive use. Doubtless
a societal type is perpetuated-though other observers find a noteworthy change of elite type in our day-but this type may well have
great utility for the society. It is necessary to ask also whether other
elites ("responsible" bureaucracies, union leaders, ecclesiastics, professors) have developed more defensible selection procdures. Yet
common codes and common habits of discourse and concourse do not
prove monolithic policies by elites. It is yet to be ascertained whether
community of elite interests prevails over sectional interests. Is more
energy and money spent fighting competitors or fighting labor and
government?
Co-optation is surely more prevalent among professors than among
business executives. In either case, is the selection dysfunctional? To
be sure, "there are not strict, impersonal rules of qualifications or
seniority known to all concerned"(134) in the nomination of corporation heads, but it does not follow that selection is by ascription or is
whimsical. The high rates of business misfortune and of executive
turnover suggest that elites are not too successful in choosing agents
who will serve them well.
Mills concedes that entry into an elite would be proof of merit if
there were competition for places; today, he says, mobility provides
no such proof (349). His statement that success of the elite "is not
firmly connected with meritorious ability" is undoubtedly true enough.
But is this because the elite "are not men selected and formed by a
civil service that is linked with the world of knowledge and sensibility... they have succeeded within the American system of organized irresponsibility"(361)? Is the success of civil servants and college professors so much more solidly validated? Mills overlooks the
tough competition within corporate hierarchies and between businesses. He overlooks also the imperfections of examinations and the
protections surrounding those who have passed them. And he gives
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no thought to the possible advantages in a society that provides many
diverse channels of mobility.
But let us consider each of the power elites briefly. Higher military
officers originate in upper-middle or upper class families-though Mills
concedes that training outweighs origin for these men(192). He fails
to point out the growing democratization of officer corps in most
countries or to notice the role of nationalism in this trend. There is
evidence that officers are less isolated from other citizens than in former generations, and it is probable that today they more fully share
civilian viewpoints. We have little grounds for charging that they
carry militaristic attitudes over into civilian positions upon retirement.8
Congressmen also, as is well known, are rarely of plebian origin
(248). Yet while their composition has changed little for generations,
governmental policies have drifted leftward. Are the well-born congressmen less interested in mass welfare than the more "representative" state legislators? One doubts that the national publics are less
effective or less well informed than state or municipal publics. It
would indeed be risky to infer anything about the social composition
of a parliament from the character of the legislation adopted. Nor
can one be sure that either the quality of congressmen has declined
or that "more democratic" parliaments of other nations are of higher
quality and more interested in the welfare of ordinary people.
It is trite to say that only a small fraction of top business executives
are sons of laborers. But there is substantial evidence (not mentioned
by Mills) that despite the growing size of corporations sons of laborers
and clerks find it somewhat easier to rise into executive places. And
such men of humble origin are more commonly heads of giant firms
than of medium-sized firms and are more common in the rapidly
growing or the non-family firms. This is the kind of topic, to repeat,
about which we need comparative data: what is the proportion of
workers' sons among bishops, professors, winners of Nobel prizes, etc.?
Coming to "the rich," we must agree with Mills that accumulation
of fortunes has been facilitated by corrupt private and public agents
throughout our history. Many rich men really were "robber barons."
But here again Mills cannot decide what horse he will ride. He first
decries this speculative method of amassing wealth. He then argues
that such accumulation is becoming less common and that a growing
proportion of fortunes are inherited. And finally he bemoans the decline 'in "new"fortunes. Surely the contemporary wealthy cannot be
indicted on all scores at once.9
8 The vivid sketch of the military personality (195) is undocumented.

9 Though Mills' data on fortunes are inadequate to support either his own
or the opposite conclusions concerning trends in the origins of "the rich", his data
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The Power Elite as Subverters of Responsive and
Responsible Government
Mills' chapter on mass society is of outstanding quality. In a segmented society of aggressive interest groups and in which publics
have inadequate "structural views" the tasks of government are indeed
formidable. Characteristically, Mills sees only the dysfunctional trends
and fails to credit healthy developments. After all, it is not certain the
public today is less mature in judgment nor that its thinking has become progressively irrelevant. One can find little evidence that publics
in nations with different political structures are more knowledgeable.
What, in fact, is Mills' position? It is not very illuminating to be
told that "a small group of men are now in charge of the executive
decisions"(231), for this has always been true; it is almost a definition
of an executive. We must ask instead whether the political elite today
have more autonomy of decision or whether they are increasingly
checked by aroused interest groups, independent voters, and the
closer texture of our societal pattern.
More important is the fact, emphasized by Mills, that institutions
of power have shifted from political to administrative form(306).
But from the way in which he writes one would infer that this is a
dirty trick played on the rest of society by the power elite. Process
and cause are confused by the focus on what Mills calls "political outsiders" and "party hacks" who now direct our government (235). Looking at the more pessimistic side of the picture, we may still wonder
why the growing role of the nationalistic state in this trend is ignored.
contain important biases toward the results he finds. 1) The main bias lies in the
1925-50 comparison, since the two sets of names are not independent. He traced
the heirs of the 1925 list together with the biggest holders of stocks (and their
heirs) for the largest 200 non-financial corporations of 1937-38. These men were
the core of his 1950 list, supplemented by what he could find in news items about
other men, mainly Texans. If he had not added this supplementary group his
whole 1950 list would have been a collection of heirs (plus a few men who had
attained great wealth when very young in pre-depression years or when comparatively young and at the depth of the depression). 2) Another bias lies in
dealing with the 90 richest men in each generation. Ninety men are a progressively smaller share of the 1900, 1925, and 1950 populations; hence he is using
a more and more select group and his 1950 cases are the richest of the richest.
It would be most surprising if there were not a larger percentage of inherited
fortunes among the very richest men than among the richest. 3) Even if these
biases were absent, it is notable that Mills pays no attention to the population of
parents of each generation and thus fails to use chance frequences as the base for
his estimates. 4) There is one other point whose implications for inter-generation
comparisons are not clear. The 1925 set, which is the only one anywhere near a
sample, is taken from 1924 tax lists. However, all cases for which information
concerning parents was lacking were omitted as were all 1950 "picked up" cases
for which this information was not procurred. In justifying this procedure, Mills
makes the curious statement that such fortunes are not 'durable" or "well-known"
anyway. True enough, for they are rarely established families.
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Alliances of military, large corporations, and federal officials may in
the last analysis be rooted in the demand by citizens that their nation
have an exalted rank. That the church, family, and school have yielded
place to economic, military, and political domains is not new; what is
new is the demonic power accorded to these dominant three by the
reign of nationalism. Jouvenal's discussion of power seems more penetrating than Mills'. 10 Perhaps it is assumed that nationalism too is
created by the elites for their own ends-an assumption difficult to
prove in the face of evidence about the status incidence of internationalist versus nationalist ideas.
One other important aspect of causation is almost neglected by
Mills, namely, enhancement of the central administration resulting
from intrusion of the state into economic life and from the problems
generated by a complex economy. A deeper and more widespread
concern with public welfare is a strong influence here. Moreover, the
economic elites find themselves constrained by pressures of many
kinds to maintain mass levels of living. The increasingly public character of giant enterprises creates power but also vulnerability to
counter power and public suspicion. Awareness of identities of interests become more widespread. Accordingly, elites become every
year less able to act primarily in their own short-run interests.
Mills deplores the growing proportion of higher appointive officials
who have never been elected to any public office (280). At the same
time he suggests that, as is undoubtedly the case, much of the chicanery among the elites occurs in default of a "stable bureaucracy."
It is not quite clear how he thinks the civil service and elective political
leaders should function or what their respective roles and relations
with one another should be. This vagueness makes it difficult to
understand the nature of his argument concerning the unresponsiveness of the "political outsiders." Having argued strongly elsewhere
for an objective merit system of advancement to the top throughout
society, does he make an exception for top levels of government? Or
does he assume, contrary to most political scientists, that an appointive
official is responsive to the public in the same sense as an elective one?
What is the relation between Mills' desire for a "stable bureaucracy"
and his guild socialism?
But let us skip over these ambiguities of both realities and utopias.
Other omissions are more important in the present context. Notable,
for example, is Mills' casualness about the price to be paid for having
the kind of officialdom he prefers. The absence of this group does give
10 B. de Jouvenal, On Power: Its Nature and the History of Its Growth (translated by J. F. Huntington), 1949, New York: Viking.
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great license to private bodies. Is is not probable, however, that pressure groups would be even more powerful under a more centralized
government unless liquidated? Into the balance must be thrown the
possible loss of an invigorating dynamic inherent in our present structure. We must not overlook both the services and the checks on power
monopoly in the activities of many unofficial bureaucracies involved
in the public business: farm and labor leaders, businessmen, volunteer
civil groups, ornery journalists. Even patronage seeking may have
positive functions provided it is sufficiently diverse and at the same
time limited. We have more government in business as well as more
business (and other groups) in government. Our government is not
merely "the new state of the corporate commissars"(274).
Let us return to the question of the broader use today of appointment of officials. Why does Mills find this so disturbing? For decades
political scientists have urged its advantages in the public interest, but
Mills does not consider it worthwhile to answer their arguments. Nor
has he considered the possibility that the struggles of executive with
legislature are due often to executive sensitiveness to broad and less
organized interests. And how does all this fit with criticisms of the
localism of congressmen?
Most of us are prone to criticize congressional localism, and for
good reasons. Nevertheless there is something to be said on the other
side. If this localism makes the congressman a less able judge of
national issues, it may at the same time sensitize him to the interests
of ordinary people living in a particular place. Every social problem
has a local habitation. Within our constitutional framework this localism strengthens the widely distributed pressure groups such as small
businessmen or farmers or laborers and the sub-groups among these.
Mills finds such groups to have mainly nuisance value (243, 255).
Yet the Eisenhower administration had to abandon its farm program.
At no point does Mills examine any of the studies of the career of
specific legislative programs. How can anyone in the present state of
our knowledge assert that grass roots organizations play a smaller role
than formerly?
Finally, while the effort to compromise contending pressure groups
often compromises a legislator, it is by no means certain that this enhances the power of the elites. Nor is the role of giant corporations
entirely dysfunctional. The policies of farm or labor blocs, objectively
viewed, may be less in their own interests than the policies suggested
to these blocs by spokesmen for "the corporate elite." That vested interests often "come together under the umbrella of government" tells
us nothing about the power elite. Nor can we be at all certain that
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the absence of "responsible, centralized parties" serves elite ends, injures the common man, aids the corporate rich, or strengthens the
military.
The Strange Forbearanceof the Power Elite
Mills' failure to demonstrate power in action has already been
mentioned. Moreover, a minor and contradictory theme developed by
Mills himself brings out the reluctance of these men of power to act.
That military chieftains enjoy a more pervasive influence, perhaps
largely by civilian default, is beyond dispute(200). The absolute
power of this corps is not so readily assessed. Why, for example, can
the military never win their cherished universal training? Tracing the
ramifications of Pentagon officialdom is difficult, but the reader deserves at least a few examples from peacetime." "In so far as the
structural clue to the power elite today lies in the enlarged and military state, that clue becomes evident in the military ascendancy. The
warlords have gained decisive political relevance and the military
structure of America is in not inconsiderable part a political structure"
(275). The opening sentence of this statement appears to reduce it
to a formal proposition. The dictionary defines ascendance as paramount influence, superior to all others. What does "decisive political
relevance" mean?
Do the rich, we may also ask, have more privileges than in 1850?
Do they in fact succeed in acquiring and holding a larger share of the
aggregate wealth today? One is even curious as to whether the distribution of wealth among us is more unequal than in nations with
reputations for greater probity.' 2 When discussing income data Mills
rejects out of hand the leading study (by Kuznets) which shows
diminishing inequality of income distribution-on the grounds that
tax evasion makes the data worthless. The tenor of Mills' arguments
should lead us to expect that income inequality should instead be
growing.
Cartter recently proposed an "ideal" income distribution: the top
"1When one reads this statement by George C. Marshall one wonders
whether disdain of civilians is as wide read among the warlords as Mills asserts.
"The emphasis often placed solely on the military aspects of world affairs does a
disservice to the cause of peace. The more that present differences are talked
about and treated exclusively as a military problem the more they tend to become so."
12Though wealth appears to be more unequally distributed in England than
here, some recent analyses by A. M. Cartter (Redistribution of Incomes in Post-war Britain, 1955, New Haven: Yale University) suggest caution. About one per
cent of English wealthholders possess over two-fifths of all wealth, but only a
fourth of this aggregate is held by the persons who are in the top one per cent of
income receivers. Presumably corporate stocks are more closely held.
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income not more than ten times the lowest and the lowest not less
than half the mean income. For postwar incomes before taxes in England, Sweden, and the United States only about ten per cent of the
aggregate national income would need to be redistributed to reach
this ideal. Both before and since World War II the top five percent
of income receivers in this country have received a smaller share of
aggregate pre-tax income than the corresponding groups in England
or Sweden. 13 These kinds of figures suggest that our theory of power
and our theory of economic processes do not go along together.
Mills endorses no naive conspiracy theory of business operation,
but such an assumption seems to contribute to the vagueness of his
thinking. Due to the dispersal of security holdings, within a small
circle of the rich but nevertheless across corporate boundaries, "the
executives and owners who are in and of and for this propertied class
cannot merely push the narrow interests of each property; their interests become engaged by the whole corporate class"(121). This elite
therefore "possesses a certain autonomy from any specific property
interest. ... It is, in operating fact, class-wide property"( 122). Until
one is able to demonstrate that the balance of elite operations is against
the public weal, this remains verbalism.
The whole argument about "concentration of business" remains
equally equivocal. There is after all a widespread judgment among
economists that the economy during our generation is becoming more
competitive, or at least not more monopolistic. Do executives spend
more time competing or in collusive action? If they did compete
vigorously, this to Mills would be heinous. When they collaborate
for the stability of the whole economy he calls them "sophisticated"
and thinks they are "using the dominant liberal rhetoric for their own
purposes"( 122).14 He believes the corporate elite shapes the economy
and sets levels of employment and purchasing power.15 Imagine the
public wrath if they did have such power. And then "the fact that
the executives do not own the property they manage means that by
their decision they do not risk their own property"(129). If they are
13
Cartter shows that in the England of 1880 42% of pre-tax incomes would
need to be redistributed to equalize incomes; by 1937 this share was only 27%
and in 1948 only 24%. For the United States in 1946 only 31% need have been
reallocated. These data suggest that power elites have become progressively less
able--or less willing-to divert income to their own pockets and suggest also

that it is difficult to identify any power elite in terms of income.
14 As with Freudianism and Marxism, so with Millsism, no man can demonstrate his sincerity.
15 Economists have shown that there would be little possibility of maintaining
a high level of employment solely through private business investment decisions
and wage policies even if big business men had social ends as their primary goals.
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not lackeys, what is their motivation? Would they be less profitoriented if they were the owners?
This triple elite, in short, "are in command of the major hierarchies
and organizations of modem society"(4). But this tells us nothing
about where effective decision rests. Undeniably heads of government
and of business dispose of more resources today, and organizations are
more centralized. But at the same time the pattern of social relationships has become more integrated; it is not obvious that command
posts today enjoy greater autonomy. Here again the nationalist state
is a factor. The very salience of these men chains them.
In due course Mills turns to another way of defining this elite:
"those political, economic, and military circles which as an intricate
set of overlapping cliques share decisions having at least national
consequences. In so far as (sic) national events are decided, the power
elite are those who decide them"(18). Ignoring the key question as
to how many things are really "decided" we must face the choice: are
the elite the top men in the institutions, or are they the men who
decide the key questions? These may be two quite different things.
We must independently identify the elite and then ascertain if the
actual course of events is decided by this elite.
Mills' definitions do seem wayward. He begins with an essential
logical caution: "no matter how we might define the elite, the extent
of its members' power is subject to historical variation. If, in a dogmatic way, we try to include that variation in our generic definition,
we foolishly limit the use of a needed conception"(20). However,
"the idea of the power elite implies nothing about the process of
decision-making as such: it is an attempt to delimit the social areas
within which that process, whatever its character, goes on. It is a conception of who is involved in the process"( 21). This last statement
is then supported dogmatically or by redefinition. War and depression
are controllable and "by whom else but those who now command the
enormously enlarged and decisively centralized means of decision and
power?"(26). "All means of power tend to become ends to an elite
that is in command of them. And that is why we may define the power
elite in terms of the means of power-as those who occupy the command posts"(23).
What we really need are testable propositions about the locus and
processes of power; we should have the questions before the answers.
Mills undercuts his thesis that elites are exemplifications of institutions
when he says an elite need not merely follow assigned roles but "may
call into question the structure, their position within it, or the way
in which they are to enact that position"(24).
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Yet one infers that doubt about his major theses impels Mills to
focus upon crises and to point out the serious effects resulting from
failure of an elite to act. "Yet in our time the pivotal moment does
arise, and at that moment small circles do decide or fail to decide
... the sequence of maneuvers which involved the United States in
World War II was such a 'moment'. . . . And is not that what is
meant when it is said that we live in a time of big decisions, of decisively centralized power?"(22). But what does this tell us of the
forces determining decisions or of why deciders decided as they did?
What was their freedom to choose? Were the decisions in the "Fort
Sumpter incident" any less big than today's decisions?
The same crisis theme recurs when Mills faces up to the conflicts
within the elite. The elite is "frequently in some tension: it comes together only on certain coinciding points and only on certain occasions
of 'crisis"(276). Perhaps the real decisions are made in the many
antecedent events. Still the elite is not a mere agent of the upper
class, for that "doesn't allow enough autonomy to the political order
or its agents"(277). This might have been a fruitful lead, but there is
no effort to trace any issue through the intricacies of the political
order. The full circularity of the logic is finally revealed in saying
that whether the elite does or does not decide "is less important than
the fact that they do occupy such pivotal positions"(4).
It follows that Mills is heedless of the evidence he himself elaborates about "liberal businessmen" and the sensitiveness of modern
elites to public opinion. The following quotations and comments indicate this forbearance of the men of power.
Today we cannot allow larger firms to fail "given political expectations and military commitments"(8). But whence these decisive political expectations? "No matter how great their actual power, they
tend to be less acutely aware of it than of the resistances of others to
its use. Moreover, most American men of affairs have learned well the
rhetoric of public relations"(4). But why do elites no longer dare to
be arrogant publicly?
Though "prestige is the shadow of money and power", the elite go
so far as to "strive to make their names notable, their actions acceptable, their policies popular"(83). "High political figures, even when
it goes against their status grain, have had to learn to be folksy"(85).
Still, while neither owners nor managers can damn the public, "together, as a set of corporate cliques, they can say what they want,
although today they are usually too wise in the ways of public relations to say it, and besides they do not need to say it"(134). Power
is "uneasy before the suspected opinions of the masses, and, accord-
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ingly, opinion-making becomes an accepted technique of power-holding and power-getting"(310). "Manipulation becomes a problem
whereever men have power that is concentrated and wilful but do not
have authority, or when, for any reason, they do not wish to use their
power openly. Then the powerful seek to rule without showing their
powerfulness. They want to rule, as it were, secretly, without publicized legitimation. .

.

. Small circles of men are making decisions

which they need to have at least authorized by indifferent or recalcitrant people over whom they do not exercise explicitly authority"(317).
It is difficult to make any coherent interpretation of the foregoing
statements or to harmonize this chaste picture of the elite with earlier
assertions about their ascendancy and the potency of modem instruments of power.
Perhaps the elite really have little need to be uneasy before public
opinion. Perhaps elite and mass opinion are not too different, or differ
in other ways than Mills assumes. There is indeed evidence that on
many issues (especially those not involving unions) business executives are to the left of the public. The Stouffer study of beliefs about
communism reports business executives to be firmer defendants of
basic rights than the public. 1 6 Though executives are not as a whole
our most liberal group, if a professor seeks academic freedom he
should look for the wealthiest board of trustees.
The Need for a Functional Analysis of the Power Elites
The fundamental shortcomings of this as of most other discussions
of power groups is the failure to determine their societal functions.
We can all agree that dominant groups have many deleterious consequences. But our society is complex and dynamic and by Mills' admission our society is operated by a power elite. This would seem to
be a positive function. The problem is to balance the two sorts of
.6"The Business Man and Civil Liberties," Fortune, May 1955, 114-15.
For example:
Business Men
Other Citizens
Education:
College Other
College Other
Percentages agreeing
Persons favoring government ownership
of railroads &big industries should be
allowed to teach in college ..................
59
34
42
30
The book of an admitted Communist
should be kept in public library ..........
70
89
50
20
A person whose loyalty has been questioned in Congress but who swears he
never was a Communist should be
kept as professor ....................................
91
80
78
66
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activities. At the same time one must not define the problem away.
Mills, for example, denies that the elites are operating in a context of
hard circumstances; he speaks of the present world situation "as now
officially defined"(184). Which of the elites will take the initiative
"depends upon the 'tasks of the period,' as they, the elite, define
them"(277).
It is not analysis to say that the 1950 entrepreneur is engaged in
"the setting up of a financial deal which merges one set of files with
another"(133). How decide which sets of files to merge and for what
purpose? "Only the uninformed would think that what was needed
in high policy offices" was managerial ability (140) is a rash statement in the fact of business failures and weak corporations. Ironically,
the Soviet government desperately seeks to instill this quality into
executives and to rehabilitate profits as an economic control.
To be sure, Soviet history demonstrates that industrialization does
not require "the services of a private stratum of multi-millionaires"(99).
But it may have been the fact that our social order permitted millionaires which enabled us to effect rapid development without sacrificing
liberty and millions of lives. Which country paid the higher price?
Certainly also Soviet managers wield a power permitted to few western
industrialists ever: power to keep a man from changing his job, power
to deny him a roof over his head or sufficient food, loss of social security rights for trivial infractions of shop rules, or imprisonment. The
tiny percentage of national income consumed, apart from reinvestment, by our millionaires may have been a modest price.
If we would evaluate the impact of the power elite we must comprehend also how decentralization of powers, and especially of economic powers, is built into the structure of our society. Our entrepreneurs are quasi-officials wielding publicly approved authority.
Their tasks are not merely usurped. How they function must be judged
by explicit criteria. Mills shirks this task because he just plain does
not like business men, and one infers he has little more respect for
the "vote market."
This myopia extends to his evaluations of the hybrid rich and
corporate elite: the "new corporate world of privilege and prerogative"(147). We are not instructed by being told these are not two
distinct and segregated groups, nor is it useful to write about giant
corporations as basic units of wealth "to which individuals of property
are variously attached" (116). Unless the rich will live from government bonds where else can they invest? Do corporation executives
really feel a strong bond with the rich owners of their firms? One
wonders if both groups view retention of undistributed earnings in the
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same light. How about the adjustment of bonuses when earnings decline or the shift from bonds to stocks? These are the sorts of questions for which we need answers rather than comments on "managerial reorganization of the propertied class."
Mills prefers to indict rather than to describe. He says the corporate revolution has "transformed property from a tool of the workman
into an elaborate instrument by which his work is controlled and a
profit extracted from it'(119)-to which the appropriate reply is to
mention the immensely valuable tools "loaned" to workmen and the
resulting increase in productivity and incomes. What, moreover, do
the statistics of profits tell us?
At several points Mills makes shrewd comments about the undermining of local elites by the nation-wide expansion of corporation
branches. Such corporations are indeed giants, but do they have more
power in the national arena than the smaller units of an earlier generation within their more local orbits?
Executives of such corporations live well and command many
luxuries. But if one will interpret this picture in terms of power one
must show that they live better, relative to the masses and relative to
their services to society, than former elites. 1 7 There are the rich and
the high salaried, but how much power would the elites lose if we
changed our ways of distributing incomes? Perhaps then more powerful and uncontrolled elites of officialdom and the military would move
to the center of the stage. Would a more centralized government
produce more opportunities or generate more numerous countervailing
powers? Perhaps we have some fluidities in our power structure
gained by recognizing wealth accumulation as one source of power.
Mills' discussion of "the celebrities" is a delightful vignette, but its
bearing on the rest of his discussion is unclear. He sees celebrities as a
smokescreen for the elites; the "social visibility of elites is lowered by
the status distraction." Mills believes these glamor pictures are created to divert public attention, and public wrath, from the real status
and power positions. But a picture of executives running around to
night clubs does not correspond to what we know of the work pressure
on them. It is doubtful that the public is so stupid as to confuse Frank
Sinatra with a corporation head; if they did, would it drain away
antagonism to the real power holders or have the opposite effect?
What poll data do we have about these public conceptions of executives and celebrities? Mills seems unable to tear his gaze from fascinatV~Nowhere does Mills deal with the problem raised by jouvenal (op. cit.,
80-1) who points out that while film stars and other entertainers are not begrudged their high earnings from "unproductive"' services, the public resents high
incomes of corporation executives who revolutionize the level of living of the
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ing but minor details of elite life that are dramatic but of questionable
functional relevance.
It has been the contention of this paper that we do not yet have an
incisive dissection of the problem of power. Mills' exciting and persuasive book rests on a naive conception of social structure and is too
prone to parade formal statements as empirical generalizations. The
central theme about the paramount power of the elites is neutralized
by an insistence that elites must conceal not only their motives but
their operations and must use the mesmerism of publicity. The gravest
defect, however, is the failure to examine the various functions of
elites and the absence of any specific instances of power in the actual
context of decision. There are numerous questions that writers on
power typically fail to deal with.
1. When one's purpose is to attenuate class conflicts, can a book
written in the temper of this one serve that end?
2. What really are the effects of the rich upon our society? If one
wants a public-spirited elite, why deplore the multiplication of rentiers?
3. Under the sway of which type of elite-a trained governmental
bureaucracy or corporation executives-would minorities have the most
opportunities?
4. What are the sources of power other than wealth-which is the
only one Mills deals with.
5. What business motivations are there in addition to money?
Does not the professionalization of business management mean that
men who could become very rich will become merely rich?
6. What is the role of money motives outside business?
7. In those realms, such as the academic world, where money
motives are presumed to be less urgent, are 'interlocking directorates'
and 'concentration of control' less prominent? Is recruitment of new
leadership more efficient? How public spirited and responsible is the
'responsible bureaucracy' of academic life?
8. What is the power potential of labor unions and farm blocs and
trade associations as compared to labor, farmers, and business men?
One may say of Mills what he said of Veblen: "His style makes it
plausible, even when the criticism is not taken seriously. What he
wrote remains strong with the truth, even though the facts do not cover
the scene and the characters that have emerged in our time"(58).
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